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DRAFTING LESSONS FROM THE RECENT PAST: 




I.   INTRODUCTION 
The resolution of civil disputes through arbitration has become prominent.1 This 
is partly attributable to the desirability of adjudicating disputes in arbitration rather than 
litigation. Arbitration boasts efficiency, adjudicators who are experts in their field, costs 
relatively lower than litigation, and a private forum in which parties can preserve 
confidentiality.2 Moreover, “arbitration is a matter of contract.”3 As such, parties are 
generally free to tailor their arbitral process to suit their needs.4  
Although these aspects of arbitration are quite attractive, other features of the 
process illustrate the importance of drafting a sound arbitration agreement. In most cases, 
arbitration is final and binding and appeal is permissible only in truly exceptional 
circumstances.5 Arbitration may also become costly where parties contest the validity of 
an arbitration agreement in court.6 Moreover, contesting an arbitration agreement in court 
prolongs the proceeding and invites potentially unsavory interference into the arbitral 
process.7 With this much at stake, a well-drafted arbitration agreement is essential. In 
addition to avoiding the above consequences, a skillfully written arbitral agreement 
expedites the process, eliminates needless confusion, provides the arbitrator with clear 
rules, and honors the parties’ intent to arbitrate.  
Moreover, there is an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute 
resolution.”8 Consistent with this policy, arbitration agreements are presumptively 
                                                
* Shari Maynard is an Associate Editor of the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2017 Juris 
Doctor Candidate at the Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 See Georgios I. Zekos, Constitutionality of Commercial/Maritime Arbitration, 45 J. MAR. L. & COM. 35, 
38 (2014) (discussing the prevalence of arbitration). 
2 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 451-52 (2010). 
3 Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 769 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Bel-Ray Co., Inc. v. Chemrite (Pty) 
Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
4 Id. 
5 See Drahozal, supra note 2, at 433, 455. 
6 See William B. Gould IV, Kissing Cousins?: The Federal Arbitration Act And Modern Labor Arbitration, 
55 EMORY L.J. 609, 649 (2006) (arguing that judicial interference in arbitration “delays the process and 
makes it more costly.”). 
7 See id. 
8  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985). 
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enforceable.9 This favor is generous, but not unconditional. Under the FAA, a court may 
invalidate an arbitration agreement “on such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”10 These grounds include “generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”11 Additionally, courts may vacate 
arbitral awards in some circumstances, such as when an arbitrator exceeds his authority.12 
There has been no shortage of recent cases in which drafting deficiencies in 
arbitration agreements caused extensive litigation, leading parties to seek invalidation of 
their arbitral clause or vacatur of the arbitrator’s award. Accordingly, this article will 
explore recent court decisions from United States jurisdictions where deficient arbitration 
agreements resulted in litigation because of issues that could have been prevented at the 
drafting stage. The primary focus is on assessing the mistakes these litigants made and 
proposing ways for future drafters to avoid the same missteps. Part II is organized in 
accordance with the deficiencies courts have recently found in arbitration agreements: 
general contract defenses (namely, unconscionability and lack of mutuality); equitable 
estoppel; ambiguous or otherwise poorly written clauses; and excess of authority. After a 
critical discussion of recent cases, Part III addresses strategies future drafters may employ 
to avoid the pitfalls examined. In this section, the arbitral clauses discussed are rewritten 
where particularly instructive.  
There is no foolproof method to prevent future disputes regarding an arbitration 
agreement or ensure its enforcement if challenged. However, assessing the costly 
mistakes of past litigants and taking practical steps to avoid them significantly 
strengthens one’s own agreement and decreases the likelihood of tedious disagreements 
and their attendant detriments in the future. 
                                                
9 See Milloul v. Knight Capital Grp., Inc., No. A-1953-13T2, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2115, at *10 
(N.J. Super. App. Div. Sept. 1, 2015). 
10 Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. 2014) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
11 Id. 
12 See Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671-72 (2010) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 
10(a)(4)). 
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II.  DRAFTING DEFICIENCIES OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AS DISCUSSED IN RECENT 
COURT DECISIONS 
A.   General Contract Defenses 
1.   Unconscionability 
Unconscionability is one of the most common grounds on which parties challenge 
the validity of arbitration agreements.13 It has two forms: procedural and substantive.14 
Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the agreement was formed.15 
In this respect, the emphasis is on whether there was oppression arising from an 
“inequality of bargaining power,” or surprise arising from the inconspicuous nature of the 
arbitral agreement.16 Factors that contribute to procedural unconscionability include 
adhesiveness and conspicuousness of the agreement.17 Substantive unconscionability 
concerns the content of the agreement, specifically whether the terms produce “overly 
harsh or one-sided results.”18 Imposition of significant costs on the weaker party and 
designation of an arbitrator with a conflict of interest are examples of substantively 
unconscionable terms.19 Courts typically assess the substantive and procedural aspects of 
an agreement independently to determine whether it is unconscionable.20 Numerous 
drafting errors can contribute to a finding of unconscionability. An assessment of recent 
cases involving unconscionability challenges to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements is illustrative.  
In Caplin Enters. v. Arrington, the plaintiffs signed one of two versions of an 
arbitration clause, one old and one new, as part of their contractual agreement with Zippy 
Check, a check cashing business.21 When the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that Zippy 
Check engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation and predatory lending, the business 
                                                
13 Nicole F. Munro & Peter L. Cockrell, Drafting Arbitration Agreements: A Practitioner's Guide for 
Consumer Credit Contracts, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 363, 366 (2013). 
14 Caplin Enters. v. Arrington, 145 So.3d 608, 614 (Miss. 2014). 
15 See Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 3d 1070, 1077 (2014); see also Munro & Cockrell, 
supra note 13, at 367. 
16 See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1205 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Ortiz, 52 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1077. 
17 See Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d  at 1205; see also Munro & Cockrell, supra note 13, at 368. 
18 Ortiz, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1077; see also Mohamed, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1207. 
19 See State ex rel. Hewitt v. Kerr, 461 S.W.3d 798, 812 (Mo. 2015); see also Munro & Cockrell, supra 
note 13, at 369. 
20 Ortiz, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1077; Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Mo. 2015). 
21 Caplin, 145 So. 3d at 611. 
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moved to compel arbitration while the plaintiffs asserted that the agreement was 
unconscionable.22  
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.23 Procedurally, the old version 
constituted “several unnumbered paragraphs in fine print.”24 Substantively, the agreement 
permitted the defendant to “pursue all judicial remedies to collect on the debt” yet 
required that the plaintiffs arbitrate all of their claims.25 Further, under the agreement, 
Zippy Check’s liability could not exceed the amount that the plaintiffs paid for its 
services, which ranged from $65 to $72.26 Because the costs of arbitration would have 
likely exceeded these amounts, Zippy Check effectually drafted the agreement to ensure 
that its liability would be so “nominal that it has the practical effect of avoiding almost all 
responsibility for a breach.”27 The newer version of the agreement was similarly 
deficient.28   
Hewitt presents another opportunity to assess drafting errors that contribute to 
unconscionability.29 The plaintiff, Todd Hewitt, was employed by the St. Louis Rams, an 
affiliate of the National Football League (“NFL”).30 His employment contract included an 
arbitration clause, which stated that the plaintiff was “legally bound by the Constitution 
and By-Laws and Rules and Regulations of the National Football League and by the 
decisions of the Commissioner.”31 The stated rules gave the NFL commissioner “full, 
complete, and final jurisdiction and authority to arbitrate.”32 When plaintiff was informed 
that his employment contract would not be renewed, he brought suit against his employer 
alleging age discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act.33 The plaintiff argued 
that the arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was adhesive 
and offered to him hurriedly.34 The plaintiff also argued that the agreement was  
substantively unconscionable because it did not specifically provide for the arbitration of 
                                                
22 Caplin,145 So. 3d at 613. 
23 Id. at 617. 
24 Id. at 611. 
25 Id. at 616. 
26 Id. at 617. 
27 Caplin,145 So. 3d at 617. 
28 Id. 
29 Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d 798. 
30 Id. at 803. 
31 Id. at 803-04. 
32 Id. at 823. 
33 Id. at 804. 
34 Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 804. 
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statutory rights, did not state or describe the arbitration guidelines, and designated the 
NFL commissioner as sole arbitrator.35  
The court concluded that the agreement was not procedurally unconscionable 
because procedural unconscionability requires more than “inequality in bargaining 
power.”36However, the court found that the agreement was substantively 
unconscionable.37 The arbitral contract encompassed “any dispute” between the parties 
and this broad language included statutory claims.38 No arbitration guidelines were 
incorporated into the agreement because the guidelines were not clearly identified and 
described.39 Furthermore, the appointment of the commissioner as sole arbitrator was 
one-sided because the commissioner, as an NFL employee, was in “a position of bias” 
that could unfairly prejudice the plaintiff in the arbitral proceeding.40 
Yet another example of an arbitral agreement challenged on unconscionability 
grounds is the agreement at issue in Gutierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs. LLC.41 There, 
Carter Brothers employed the plaintiffs to install AT&T security systems.42 Plaintiffs 
were required to sign an “Independent Contractor Agreement” that included an 
arbitration clause.43 They later brought suit, arguing that the defendants required them to 
sign the agreement to avoid the legal consequences of deeming them employees.44 The 
defendants moved to compel arbitration, resulting in the plaintiffs’ claim that the contract 
was unconscionable.45 
In denying the defendant’s motion, the court found that the arbitration agreement 
was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and therefore invalid.46 
Procedurally, the agreement was adhesive: it was offered to plaintiffs as a condition of 
employment, with no opportunity for negotiation or modification.47 Substantively, the 
plaintiffs, who lived and worked in California, were required to travel to Atlanta and 
                                                
35 Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 804. 
36 Id. at 809-10. 
37 Id. at 814. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 811. 
40 Hewitt, 461 S.W.3d at 813. 
41 Gutierrez v. Carter Bros. Sec. Servs., LLC, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (E.D. Cal. 2014). 
42 Id. at 1209. 
43 Id. at 1209-10. 
44 Id. at 1209. 
45 Id. at 1210. 
46 Gutierrez, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1210. 
47 Id. 
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evenly split the costs of arbitration with the defendants.48 Because the costs of complying 
with these two financial requirements would likely exceed the plaintiffs’ maximum 
potential recovery, the agreement effectively barred the plaintiffs from resolving their 
claims and was therefore substantively unconscionable.49  
In each of these cases, it is evident that the drafters of the arbitration agreements 
at issue could have avoided litigation if they had removed or changed provisions that 
could raise unconscionability concerns. In some cases, prominent display of the 
arbitration agreement would have bolstered the defendant’s case, while in others, 
including terms more considerate to the other parties’ financial constraints would have 
gone a long way. These errors and their remedies will be addressed in Part III. 
2.   Lack of Mutuality 
Some courts require that when parties enter an arbitration agreement, the promise 
to arbitrate must be mutually binding on all parties.50 Lack of mutuality is evident where 
“one provision of a contract is inconsistent with the contract's arbitration clause and the 
two cannot be harmonized”51 or “when one party retains the unilateral right to amend the 
agreement and avoid its obligations.”52 In some jurisdictions, lack of mutuality is merely 
one factor that courts consider in assessing substantive unconscionability.53 In others, 
lack of mutuality alone is sufficient to invalidate an agreement.54 Because of this 
difference in jurisdictional treatment, lack of mutuality will be considered separately 
from unconscionability. 
In Greene v. Alliance Auto, the plaintiff bought a vehicle from the defendant, 
which the defendant later repossessed.55 In response to the plaintiff’s suit for damages, 
the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitral clause in the 
purchase agreement.56 The plaintiff argued that the arbitral clause was unconscionable 
because, among other things, a self-help provision undermined the defendant’s mutual 
promise to arbitrate.57 
                                                
48 Gutierrez, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1214. 
49 Id. 
50 See Heather Bromfield, The Denial of Relief: The Enforcement of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration 
Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 315, 320, 326-27 (2009). 
51 Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow, 2014 Ark. 375 at 8. 
52 Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Mo. 2014). 
53 See, e.g., Eaton 461 S.W.3d at 434; see also Greene v. Alliance Auto., Inc., 435 S.W.3d 646 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2014) (finding that a lack of mutuality was one factor that rendered the arbitration agreement 
unconscionable). 
54 Alltel, 2014 Ark. 375 at 6; Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 772 n.1. 
55 Greene, 435 S.W.3d at 648. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 649-50. 
  192 
The court agreed, finding that the agreement lacked mutuality. The agreement 
stated that “no party waives its right to elect arbitration . . . by exercising self-help 
remedies.”58 Thus, despite requiring the plaintiff to arbitrate her disputes, the arbitral 
clause allowed the defendant to seek arbitration and self-help simultaneously to remedy 
the same harm suffered from the plaintiff’s alleged breach.59  
In Baker v. Bristol Care, Inc., the plaintiff’s employment contract contained an 
arbitration agreement stating that defendant employer “reserves the right to amend, 
modify or revoke this agreement upon thirty (30) days' prior written notice to the 
Employee.”60 When a dispute arose between the parties, the plaintiff sought litigation 
while the defendant sought arbitration.61 The court found that the agreement lacked 
mutuality, as the defendant retained the unilateral right to rescind its mutual agreement to 
arbitrate.62 That a notice period was provided was immaterial, as this did not provide for 
negotiation or consent from the plaintiff.63 
Greene and Baker illustrate the drafting errors that can be made by a party who 
desires arbitration only when an exit strategy is available. However, if arbitration is the 
preferred mode of dispute resolution, this preference should be effectively reflected in the 
arbitration agreement, sans language undermining arbitral intent. 
B.  Equitable Estoppel  
Equitable estoppel refers to the general rule that a non-signatory party will be 
restricted from “embracing a contract” and later refusing to comply with the terms of that 
contract in their entirety.64 In some instances, it is equitable to require a party to arbitrate 
a dispute, although that party is not a signatory to an arbitration agreement, because that 
party’s actions have indicated a desire to arbitrate.65 Equitable estoppel is not a defense to 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, as are the other grounds discussed here. 
However, it can be asserted where the agreement by which the parties’ relationship was 
governed was poorly drafted or should have been amended in light of changed 
circumstances.  
Flintkote v. Aviva effectively illustrates the relationship between the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel and imprudent drafting.66 The plaintiff, a supplier of asbestos products, 
                                                
58 Id. at 653-54. 
59 Id. 
60 Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 773. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 777. 
63 Id. 
64 Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 221. 
65 Id. at 220. 
66 Id. 
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bought insurance policies from several London insurance carriers.67 After numerous 
claims against the plaintiff arose, the plaintiff entered a settlement agreement (the 
“Wellington Agreement”) with all of the insurance companies, save for the defendant.68 
The agreement stipulated that disputes would be resolved in mediation, then arbitration if 
mediation was unsuccessful.69 A separate mediation agreement existed, which did not 
reference arbitration.70 The plaintiff and the defendant then entered an agreement 
providing that future disputes would be resolved by litigation.71 When the relationship 
between the plaintiff and the insurance companies deteriorated, the defendant aligned 
with the companies subject to the Wellington Agreement by participating in their 
mediation, retaining the same attorneys, and jointly requesting relief from the plaintiff.72 
When the defendant later sought to litigate a dispute, the plaintiff moved to compel 
arbitration, arguing that defendant was equitably bound to arbitrate under the Wellington 
Agreement.73 
Applying Delaware law, the court discussed two types of equitable estoppel.74 
Under the “knowing exploitation” rule, “a non-signatory is equitably precluded from 
embracing a contract and then turning its back on the portions of the contract, such as an 
arbitration clause, that it finds distasteful.”75 Also, “when . . . by his conduct [a party] 
intentionally or unintentionally leads another, in reliance upon that conduct, to change 
position to his detriment” he is equitably estopped from renouncing the arbitration 
agreement.76 The court did not compel arbitration.77 The court concluded that the 
defendant did not “clear[ly] and convincing[ly]” embrace the Wellington Agreement 
because it participated in mediation only.78 Also, because there was an unambiguous 
contract requiring the defendant to litigate its claims against the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s 
reliance on the defendant’s alignment with the other insurance companies was 
unreasonable.79 
                                                
67 Id. at 217. 
68 Id. 
69 Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 217. 
70 Id. at 218. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 218-19. 
73 Id. at 219. 
74 Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 221. 
75 Flintkote, 769 F.3d at 221. 
76 Id. at 223. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 222. 
79 Id. at 223. 
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As is evident from the preceding discussion, equitable estoppel is difficult to 
establish, particularly where there is a contrary written agreement. By pre-selecting 
arbitration or amending the existing contract when the need arises, the drafter may avoid 
the burden of compelling arbitration in this manner.  
C.  Ambiguous and Otherwise Poorly Written Clauses 
1.   Ambiguity  
It is especially difficult to enforce an arbitration agreement if the court cannot 
even understand it. Here is where the problem of ambiguity arises. In such cases, the 
language of the arbitration agreement or one of its essential provisions is so unclear or 
inconsistent that the meaning cannot be discerned and judicial enforcement becomes 
futile. 
Milloul v. Knight is instructive in this respect.80 In that case, the plaintiff-
employee contended that the arbitration agreement, which defendant-employer required 
all employees to sign, did not convey that the employee was relinquishing his right to 
litigation of future disputes.81 The agreement stated, in part, that the employee agreed to: 
 
settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies 
arising out of or relating to my application for employment, my 
employment or the cessation of my employment . . . by final and binding 
arbitration . . . Such claims include but are not limited to claims under 
federal, state and local statutory law or common law.82  
 
The court found that the agreement was ambiguous and unenforceable.83 
Although arbitration agreements must be “read liberally to find arbitrability if reasonably 
possible,”84 such deference was unjustified in this instance because the agreement failed 
to communicate that the employee was forfeiting his right to a trial and that 
discrimination disputes were subject to arbitration.85  
In PCH Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cas. & Sur., Inc., PCH and CSI entered a contractual 
agreement under which CSI would provide PCH with administrative support services for 
                                                
80 Milloul, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2115, at *1. 
81 Id. at *2. 
82 Milloul, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2115, at *6-7. 
83 Id. at *20. 
84 Id. at *10. 
85 Id. at *19-20. 
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PCH’s insurance liability programs.86 Their contract contained an arbitration agreement 
stating, in part, that: “[a]ny disputes concerning any aspect of this agreement may be 
submitted to binding arbitration. The prevailing party shall be entitled to recover all costs 
incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees.”87 PCH later brought suit against CSI, 
resulting in CSI’s motion to compel arbitration.88 CSI argued that the agreement 
mandated arbitration of all disputes, while PCH contended that the language was 
permissive and merely designated arbitration as an option for resolving future disputes.89  
The court exhibited little sympathy for CSI’s position, noting that it would accord 
the agreement its plain meaning.90 The provision was ambiguous because it could be 
interpreted in more than one way.91 The court noted that if the agreement were deemed 
permissive, then another provision permitting injunctive relief to enforce the agreement 
would be moot.92 However, “as a general matter of contract law, the word ‘may’ is 
viewed as a permissive term, particularly when used in contraposition to the word 
shall.”93 Accordingly, the plainly permissive language of the agreement did not bind the 
parties to arbitration.94  
Knight and PCH Mut. Ins. Co. teach that inconsistency breeds ambiguity. This, in 
turn, undermines the parties’ recourse to arbitration. With thorough drafting, however, 
these errors can be excluded from the arbitration agreement. 
2.   Otherwise Poorly Written Clauses 
This catchall category concerns errors which may seem obvious or insignificant at 
the drafting stage, but could become major sources of contention when a dispute actually 
arises. Errors include referencing nonexistent rules and using awkward or peculiar 
phrasing.  
A drafting error of this nature led to bizarre results and extensive litigation when 
the parties in Grelu Consulting, Inc. v. Patel attempted to enforce their arbitration 
agreement.95 Four individuals entered a partnership agreement, which included an 
                                                
86 PCH Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cas. & Sur., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 2d 125, 132 (D.D.C. 2010). 
87 Id. at 143. 
88 Id. at 129. 
89 Id. at 143-44. 
90 Id. at 142. 
91 PCH Mut. Ins. Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d at 143. 
92 Id. at 144. 
93 PCH Mut. Ins. Co., 750 F. Supp. 2d at 144. 
94 Id. at 149. 
95 Grelu Consulting, Inc., v. Patel, No. A-3042-11T3, 2013 WL 2435348, at *1 (N.J. Super. App. Div. June 
6, 2013). 
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arbitration clause, for the purpose of purchasing two Dunkin’ Donuts franchises.96 The 
partnership deteriorated.97 Resolution of the disputes began in court.98 However, three of 
the partners, who had aligned together and were jointly represented by one firm, moved 
to compel arbitration.99  
Though the court granted the motion to compel arbitration, this did not end the 
conundrum.100 The parties disagreed fundamentally about the meaning of the arbitrator 
selection provision.101  That provision stated that “[e]ach party shall appoint one . . . 
arbitrator, and such arbitrator shall appoint another arbitrator . . . [and] the decision of [a] 
majority of such arbitrators . . . shall be conclusive upon the parties.”102 The plaintiffs 
argued that “each party” was synonymous with “each partner,” while the defendant 
argued that the phrase meant “each side” of the dispute.103The plaintiffs further 
contended that the provision permitted each partner to appoint one arbitrator, who would 
in turn appoint one arbitrator, for a total of eight arbitrators.104 The defendant vehemently 
opposed this construction, arguing that the resultant panel would be skewed in the 
plaintiffs’ favor.105 Instead, the defendant argued that the provision permitted the 
plaintiffs to jointly appoint one arbitrator, the defendant to appoint one arbitrator, and a 
court to appoint a third arbitrator, for a total of three arbitrators.106 The lower court 
adopted the plaintiffs’ construction, much to the defendant’s dismay.107 
On appeal, the court ruled in favor of the defendant, acknowledging that the 
arbitration agreement “would certainly not win any awards for legal drafting.”108 Another 
section of the agreement stated that “[i]f the arbitrator appointed shall fail, within ten (10) 
days after the last of the arbitrators shall have been appointed, to select another 
arbitrator,” then a court “shall be authorized and empowered to appoint such third 
arbitrator.”109 The appellate court also noted that interpreting the provision as plaintiffs 
                                                
96 Id. at *1. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at *1-2. 
99 Id. at *2. 
100 Grelu Consulting, 2013 WL 2435348, at *2. 
101 Id. at *5. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at *3. 
104 Grelu Consulting, 2013 WL 2435348, at *3-4. 
105 Id. at *3. 
106 Id. at *4. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at *5. 
109 Grelu Consulting, 2013 WL 2435348, at *7 (emphasis added by the court). 
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desired would be prejudicial against the defendant and produce an “unusually large and, 
consequently expensive” panel.110 Accordingly, the court modified the agreement to 
require a three-member panel of arbitrators by making two changes.111 First, the court 
added an “s” to the offending provision.112 Thus, instead of “[e]ach party shall appoint 
one (1) such arbitrator, and such arbitrator shall appoint another arbitrator,” the provision 
was changed to “[e]ach party shall appoint one (1) such arbitrator, and such arbitrators 
shall appoint another arbitrator.”113 The court made similar changes to the section 
addressing timely arbitrator appointments.114 Additionally, the court found that “party” 
was synonymous with side.115  
The magnitude of harm a drafter can cause by making a simple mistake or using 
overcomplicated language in the agreement is evident from the preceding discussion. The 
drafter must steer clear of these practices and implement more pragmatic techniques, as 
will be discussed in Part III. 
D.  Excess of Authority  
Arbitrators may act contrary to the parties’ arbitration agreement by “decid[ing] 
matters not properly before [them].”116 As previously noted, where an arbitrator exceeds 
his authority in this way, a court may vacate the award.117 If an arbitration agreement is 
drafted in a manner that fosters doubt about the extent of the arbitrator’s powers, an 
excess of authority challenge is more probable. 
Leshin v. Oliva presents a prime example.118 There, a couple organized a partially 
revocable family trust governed by an arbitration agreement.119 When the wife died, the 
husband set up separate trusts, one of which allotted certain property to the defendant 
upon the husband’s death.120 The plaintiff was appointed as a successor trustee.  When 
the husband died, the defendant accused the plaintiff of improprieties.121 The result of the 
                                                
110 Id. at *13. 
111 Id. at *10. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Grelu Consulting, 2013 WL 2435348, at *10. 
115 Id. at *13-14. 
116 Leshin v. Oliva, No. 04-14-00657-CV, 2015 WL 4554333, at *8 (Tex. App. San Antonio July 29, 2015). 
117 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 671-72. 
118 Leshin, 2015 WL 4554333, at * 1. 
119 Id. at *2. 
120 Id. at *3. 
121 Id. at *3-4. 
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requisite arbitration was a judgment against the plaintiff in his individual capacity.122 The 
plaintiff brought suit seeking to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded his 
authority by rendering a judgment against him in his individual rather than trustee 
capacity.123 The defendants argued that the broad language of the agreement and its 
reference to American Arbitration Association rules suggested that the plaintiff assented 
to the arbitrator’s determination regarding arbitrability.124 This included whether the 
plaintiff was personally bound by the agreement and was required to satisfy the judgment 
from his personal funds.125  
Ultimately, the court decided that the arbitrator exceeded his authority “by 
implicitly determining [that the plaintiff], individually, was a party to the arbitration 
agreement, and thereby bound by any award in his individual capacity.”126 In arriving at 
this conclusion, the court emphasized that no language in the agreement clearly gave the 
arbitrator the power to bind the plaintiff personally.127  
Expressly defining the scope of the arbitrator’s authority in the arbitration 
agreement reduces the probability of an excess of authority challenge. Though the drafter 
should not overcomplicate the agreement by launching into copious detail, some 
specificity is desirable, as this will maximize the chances that a challenged award will be 
upheld. 
III.   A DRAFTER’S GUIDE TO AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF RECENT LITIGANTS 
A.  General Contract Defenses 
1.   Unconscionability 
a.   Procedural unconscionability 
To draft an agreement devoid of procedural unconscionability, there are several 
factors to consider. First, conspicuousness should be a top priority. If the arbitration 
agreement is a clause within a larger contract, it should be placed somewhere noticeable 
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to the reader, such as near the beginning of the contract.128 Also, the content of the 
agreement must appear presentable to the reader.129  Fine print and jumbled or 
unorganized text are unsuitable. A readable font, generous spacing, and separation by 
sections, where appropriate, are optimal. Second, if the agreement is part of a larger 
contract, other portions of the contract should draw attention to the arbitration agreement 
by prompting the reader to review the arbitration clause.130 Finally, a signature line at the 
end of the arbitration agreement to indicate that the signatory has read and understands 
the agreement is invaluable, regardless of whether the arbitration agreement is embedded 
in a larger contract.131  
If negotiating the terms of a contract is impracticable or undesirable, as is often 
the case with adhesive contracts, the party who has drafted the agreement should notify 
the other party of its existence, explain its significance, and provide sufficient opportunity 
for the other party to review, comment, and perhaps opt out.132 
b.   Substantive unconscionability 
Because substantive unconscionability concerns the terms of the agreement, the 
drafter has considerable control over protecting the arbitration agreement against a 
challenge on this basis. Provisions that impose one-sidedness, are particularly severe 
when applied, or appear excessively beneficial to one party at the expense of another 
should be excluded.  
Specifically, the drafter should avoid provisions that impose all or a substantial 
portion of the costs of arbitration on a party who is obviously in a weaker position. In 
Gutierrez, for example, the employer should have paid all or a substantial portion of the 
costs of arbitration, rather than attempting to impose half of this cost on the workers.133 
The drafter may also include a provision waiving its right to recover costs and fees from 
the party on whom the agreement is imposed.134 
Furthermore, as was evident in Caplin135 and Gutierrez,136 the agreement should 
not impose costs on a party when such costs would outweigh the party’s maximum 
allowable recovery. Courts will likely interpret this tactic as a guise for avoiding liability 
for a breach of the agreement. Accordingly, the drafter may ease the financial burden of 
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arbitration on the other party by stipulating that the proceedings will occur in a forum that 
is convenient for that party,137 and by including the above suggested provisions regarding 
costs and fees.138 
Finally, arbitrator selection clauses should either designate an arbitrator free of 
any actual or apparent biases, or describe a process for selecting an impartial arbitrator. 
For example, in Hewitt, where the defendant’s arbitration agreement designated its own 
employee as sole arbitrator,139 the drafter could have instead selected a neutral party to 
appoint an arbitrator, or permitted each party to select an arbitrator, who would then 
jointly appoint a third neutral arbitrator. 
2.   Lack of Mutuality  
To eliminate lack of mutuality in the arbitration agreement, it is helpful to assess 
the pitfalls of the drafters in Greene140 and Baker.141 Rather than permitting unilateral 
recourse to remedy a breach of the contract, each provision of the arbitration agreement 
should reflect both parties’ intent to arbitrate. A provision that permits the drafter to 
pursue non-arbitral remedies without waiving the right to arbitrate should afford the other 
party a comparable legal right, such as seeking injunctive relief or other equitable 
remedies in court.142 If the drafter finds this consolation undesirable, then the drafter 
should either eliminate the alternative remedies provision altogether or mitigate the 
provision.  For instance, a mitigated provision could provide that exercising alternative 
remedies waives the right to arbitrate.  
The following changes would have likely avoided the dispute in Greene. There, 
the self-help provision at issue read:  
 
Notwithstanding this arbitration agreement, the Parties retain the right to 
exercise self-help remedies and to seek provisional remedies from a court, 
pending final determination of the Dispute by the arbitrator. No Party 
waives the right to elect arbitration of a Dispute by exercising self-help 
remedies, filing suit, or seeking or obtaining provisional remedies from a 
court.143 
 
To avoid contention, the following is a suitable alternative: 
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All Parties retain the right to exercise alternative remedies, including self-
help and seeking provisional remedies from a court. If a Party exercises 
these non-arbitral remedies, that Party waives the right to arbitrate any 
dispute arising under this agreement. 
 
Furthermore, the ability to amend, modify or revoke the arbitration agreement 
must only be offered where the consent of all parties would be required to validate the 
change and where all parties have an equal right to propose such changes. The deficient 
provision in Baker is illustrative: 
 
[The employer has] the right to amend, modify or revoke this agreement 
upon thirty (30) days' prior written notice to the Employee.144  
 
The drafter ought to have either eliminated the provision or changed it to: 
 
Each party has the right to propose amendments, modifications or 
revocation of this agreement. Such changes shall take effect upon written 
consent of all parties. All parties must consent within (30) days of any 
proposed amendment, modification or revocation. 
 
In summary, each provision of the arbitration agreement must be congruent with 
all others and embody a unified instrument. Accordingly, provisions that undermine the 
mutual promise to arbitrate should be reviewed, re-written, and harmonized with the 
remainder of the agreement.  
3.   Equitable Estoppel  
Special difficulties exist in drafting an arbitration agreement that undermines or 
supports an equitable estoppel claim. This is because, in cases where equitable estoppel is 
asserted, there is often either no written agreement or a contrary written agreement. 
However, the circumstances of Flintkote145 imply some appropriate suggestions. 
First, if a main contract governing the parties’ relationship exists, the contract 
permits amendments or modifications, and one party’s actions suggest amenability to 
arbitration, then the party desiring arbitration ought to amend the main contract by adding 
an arbitral clause. Second, if there is a separate contract requiring litigation, then the 
drafter can include a provision stating that certain enumerated acts suggesting a desire to 
arbitrate will bind a party to arbitration and void the original agreement. Any such 
provision must be written clearly and with sufficient specificity to avoid complicating the 
existing contracts. If these steps are taken, reliance on equitable estoppel to compel 
                                                
144 Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 773. 
145 Flintkote, 769 F.3d 215. 
  202 
arbitration will likely become unnecessary. For example, in Flintkote,146 the supplier 
could have provided that:  
 
If any Party acts inconsistently with its intent to resolve disputes in a 
judicial forum, that Party waives its right to such forum and must submit 
all future disputes to final and binding arbitration. “Acting inconsistently” 
includes aligning with other entities or individuals subject to an arbitration 
agreement and participating in dispute resolution processes governed by 
an agreement that mandates arbitration in later phases of a dispute. 
B.  Ambiguity/Otherwise Poorly Written Clauses 
Clarity and consistency are essential when drafting the arbitration agreement. As 
such, each provision should be written clearly, consistently, and with a singular meaning. 
In PCH,147 where the arbitral clause used permissive language in one sentence and 
compulsory language in the next, the drafter could have simply employed consistent 
language throughout the agreement reflecting the nature of the parties’ intent to arbitrate.  
Additionally, the drafter should test the application of provisions when reviewing 
unfinished versions of the arbitration agreement to ensure that each provision produces 
rational results. If the parties in Grelu Consulting148 had done this, they would have 
discovered the bizarre panel that their arbitrator-selection provision created. Furthermore, 
the drafter and all parties to the contract will be well-served if overcomplicated clauses 
are excluded from the agreement. Recall that the relevant text of the agreement in Grelu 
Consulting, Inc. stated that:  
 
[e]ach party shall appoint one . . . arbitrator, and such arbitrator shall 
appoint another arbitrator . . . [and] the decision of [a] majority of such 
arbitrators . . . shall be conclusive upon the parties.149 
 
The court resolved the dispute by pluralizing two words, finding that “party” was 
synonymous with “side,” and in so doing imposed a three-member panel. A simpler 
alternative that achieves the same result reads:  
 
Each side in the dispute shall appoint one arbitrator. The arbitrators 
appointed by each side shall then jointly appoint one arbitrator. The 
decision of a majority of this three-member panel of arbitrators shall be 
conclusive upon all parties. 
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Finally, the arbitration agreement should definitively provide that the signatory 
forfeits the right to a trial by assenting to the contract and state the types of claims subject 
to arbitration.  
C.  Excess of Authority  
An arbitrator could improperly exceed his or her authority in spite of the content 
of the arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitration agreement should specify at a 
minimum, the types of disputes the arbitrator can decide and the classes of persons bound 
by the arbitral award. If the agreement includes this language, it is less likely that the 
arbitrator will overstep his contractually imposed boundaries in these respects. This is 
because blatant violation of the agreement probably will not withstand judicial scrutiny. 
For instance, the following provision defining the scope of the arbitrator’s authority 
would have been valuable in Leshin:150 
 
The arbitrator’s decision shall be final and binding upon each party in the 
capacity in which he acts under this agreement. 
 
An even simpler alternative would have been:  
 
The arbitrator shall have no power whatsoever to bind any trustee who is a 
party to this agreement in his individual capacity. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
The arbitral process is invaluable for resolving civil disputes. The arbitration 
agreement plays an integral role in ensuring that arbitration functions efficiently and 
expeditiously. Accordingly, the drafter of the arbitration agreement must avoid drafting 
errors that could undermine the parties’ recourse to arbitration, prolong the dispute 
resolution process, or cause the parties unnecessary expense.  
In recent cases, drafting mistakes relating to unconscionability, lack of mutuality, 
equitable estoppel, ambiguity, poor writing, and excess of authority have caused 
contention among parties to arbitration agreements. Examination of these cases reveals 
that the issues could have been prevented if the drafters had employed certain strategies 
when writing the agreement. Learning from these mistakes, understanding why they were 
so costly, and implementing the appropriate drafting techniques to avoid similarly 
undesirable outcomes is invaluable for drafters of future arbitration agreements.
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